国际经贸学院李雪老师（第一作者）的学术论文《Cross-border acquisitions and the performance of Chinese publicly listed companies》11月27日在国际商学领域顶级期刊《Journal of Business Research》（SSCI影响因子7.6）上在线发表。
本文的合作通讯作者为我校“青年东方学者”彭飞副教授（常任轨）和澳洲阳光海岸大学Sajid Anwar教授。《Journal of Business Research》是国际商学领域的重要学术期刊，具有很高的国际学术声誉，中国籍作者占比目前仅为6.5%。该篇论文的发表，实现了国际经贸学院同时以第一作者和通讯作者在国际主流商学（工商管理）A类SSCI期刊上发表论文的突破。
本文在理论和实证上首次为中国海外并购的动机、过程和绩效的复杂联系提供了一个统一的研究框架。论文成果曾在全国高校国际贸易学科协作组“新常态下的中国开放型经济”研讨会与上海市第八届数量经济学理论与应用学术研讨会做主旨演讲，并引起了学术界的广泛讨论和关注。
李雪，女，经济学博士。现任上海立信会计金融学院副教授，华东师范大学硕士生导师。她在武汉大学获得经济学学士和硕士学位，在上海财经大学获得经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为跨国并购和人力资本投资等问题。她先后参与国家社科重点、教育部重点基地重大项目3项，在《Journal of Business Research》《财经研究》《中国土地科学》《经济评论》《财贸研究》等SSCI和CSSCI期刊发表论文30余篇，其中3篇论文被人大复印资料转载，2篇咨询报告获省部级领导批示，专著2本。
彭飞，男，中央财经大学经济学学士和硕士，英国伯明翰大学硕士和博士。现任上海立信会计金融学院“常任轨”副教授，上海市首届“青年东方学者”（应用经济学）。主要研究领域为劳动经济学、跨国并购和公司治理，在Regional Studies, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Cultural Economics, New Political Economy，Policy&Politics等发表SSCI论文20余篇，在《科研管理》《数量经济技术经济研究》《财贸经济》等国内权威期刊发表论文10余篇。
Abstract
Based on resource dependence theory, agency theory, and institutional theory, we develop an integrated conceptual framework for motivations, moderators, and performance of Chinese cross-border acquisitions. We then use a unique dataset, which covers the 2003–2016 period, to examine how market-seeking, resource-seeking, and managerial self-interest motivations of cross-border acquisitions influence the performance of China’s manufacturing sector publicly listed companies (PLCs). Analysis of the aggregated data shows strong support for market-seeking motivation for cross-border acquisitions. But we only find weak support for resource-seeking motivation. Our analysis also reveals the underlying agency problem thus supporting the managerial self-interest motivation for cross-border acquisitions. Disaggregated data analysis shows that all cross-border acquisitions are driven by market-seeking motivation, whereas resource-seeking is the main driver of acquisitions by state-owned and low-tech PLCs. Acquisitions by China’s private-owned PLCs and medium/high-tech PLCs are also motivated by managerial self-interest in free cash flow, which leads to the principal-agent conflict.